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1. Introduction 
In Europe a likewise high level of mergers and acquisitions in banking has been observed 
with a remarkable acceleration in consolidation activities in recent years. However, while the 
number of domestic bank mergers still increases for several EU Member States, cross-border 
banking consolidation within Europe peaked around the year of the introduction of the Euro 
and has continuously decreased since then in particular in Western European countries 
(Berger, 2007). As a consequence, the European Commission conducted a study in 2005 
which elucidated that banks not only complained about unfavorable expectations on revenue 
enhancements and cost synergies, but also and in particular, about a sparsely transparent and 
tedious bank merger review process as well as current supervisory arrangements for cross- 
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border activities in Europe (Commission, 2005). Accounting for this result, the European 
Commission has revised article 16 of the European Banking Directive in late 2006 in order to 
accelerate the bank merger review process by setting evaluation criteria to ensure cross-
country consistency, reduce regulatory discretion and promote a higher level of transparency 
(Commission, 2006). 
In our opinion, however, the Commission’s legal step suffers from inadequacy concerning 
at least one important aspect. Though competent supervisory authorities are legitimated to 
examine the financial soundness of the bidding bank pre-merger, the Commission has failed 
to consider the possible impact of promoting banking consolidation (higher market 
concentration) on systemic stability in Europe ex post. Thus, if it is true that the banking 
market’s systemic risk exposure increases with the banks’ size promoting cross-border 
banking consolidation may raise the question of whether the systemic linkages of bank 
failures will change due to the consolidation process, both domestically and cross-border. 
These aspects are even more important for Europe since coordination problems among 
prudential supervisors typically arise due to the so-called “home country principle”. This 
principle provokes that supervisory responsibility remains within the home country’s 
authority whereas the host country’s supervisory agency will only have limited powers in the 
event of a systemic situation caused by a foreign bank. As a consequence, cross-country 
cooperation between European supervisors and regulators, and in particular the responsibility 
for prudent regulation and supervision of pan-European banks that emerge from cross-border 
consolidation, is still vague (Goddard et al., 2007; Čihák and Decressin, 2007). 
Against this background this paper empirically investigates the impact of national banking 
market concentration on financial stability for the 25 Member States of the European Union 
(henceforth EU-25) over the period from 1997 to 2005. Our analysis complements and 
extends previous empirical studies on this issue (Schaeck and Čihák, 2007; Beck et al., 
2006a, 2006b; Schaeck et al., 2006; De Nicoló et al., 2004) for several specific aspects. First,  
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this is the first study that empirically investigates the relationship between banking market 
concentration and financial stability using a cross-sectional time-series dataset for the EU-25. 
While previous empirical literature has examined this relationship for a broader set of 
countries around the globe covering Europe in parts (Beck et al., 2006a, 2006b; De Nicoló et 
al., 2004) or Western European countries only (Schaeck and Čihák, 2007; Schaeck et al., 
2006), we present novel evidence by exclusively focusing on the EU-25 which allows us to 
additionally examine country specific effects among Western and Eastern EU Member States. 
Second, while previous studies have either focused on real episodes of banking crises (Beck 
et al., 2006a, 2006b; Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002) or the banks’ capital ratio as a 
proxy for financial soundness (Schaeck and Čihák, 2007; Schaeck et al., 2006), we extend the 
analysis by employing the Z-score ratio as a time-variant measure for the bank’s distance-to-
default. Third, by investigating the impact of market concentration on single components of 
the Z-score ratio (ROAA, capital ratio, ROAA volatility), we try to shed more light on the 
nexus of concentration, competition and stability in banking. Finally, we extend and enhance 
previous empirical studies by controlling for possible endogeneity problems as well as 
reverse causality between concentration and stability using instrumental variables 
regressions. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents related theoretical 
and empirical literature on the relationship between banking market concentration and 
financial stability. Section 3 contains our empirical analysis. While section 3.1 describes the 
data set, section 3.2 introduces the empirical model. Empirical results are presented and 
discussed in section 3.3. Finally, Section 4 concludes. 
2. Related literature 
Both economic theory and empirical evidence are inconclusive about the impact of 
increasing banking market concentration on financial stability.  
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First, advocates of the “concentration-stability view” suggest that larger (monopolistic) 
banks in concentrated banking systems may enhance profits and thus reduce financial 
fragility by providing higher “capital buffers” that protect them against external 
macroeconomic and liquidity shocks (Boyd et al., 2004). Similarly, Keeley (1990) argues that 
a higher charter or franchise value may deter excessive risk-taking behavior by the bank’s 
management (“charter value hypothesis”). As higher franchise values result in higher 
opportunity costs when going bankrupt, bank managers or, even more, the bank’s 
shareholders may not accept risky investments that could jeopardize their future profits (Park 
and Peristiani, 2007).      Second, it is assumed that larger banks tend to engage in “credit 
rationing” since fewer credit investments of a higher quality will increase the return of the 
singular investment and hence foster financial soundness (Boot and Thakor, 2000). 
Additionally, these banks are argued to have comparative advantages in providing credit 
monitoring services. Third, larger banks may be able to diversify loan portfolio risks more 
efficiently due to higher economies of scale and scope (Boyd and Prescott, 1986). Apart from 
these functional diversification effects, it is suggested that larger banks engaging in cross-
border activities may additionally obtain economies of scale and scope by geographical risk 
diversification.
1 Finally, it is argued, that a market with a few larger banks may be easier to 
monitor. Hence, supervision of banks may be more effective and the risk of a system-wide 
contagion should presumably recede (Allen and Gale, 2000). 
                                                 
1 Since  Méon and Weill (2005) have shown that economic cycles of many European countries are not 
perfectly correlated, geographical diversification may play an important role in reducing banks’ overall risk 
exposure. However, Carbó Valverde et al. (2007) conclude that the reliance on economies of scale alone to 
raise cost efficiency and hence to achieve intra- and inter-country dominance may not be sufficient in the 
EU banking market. In their view, the full benefits from greater economies of scale are achieved in 
conjunction with labor market reforms that allow for greater flexibility for banks to reduce their labor costs 
and to better control their input mix.  
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In contrast, proponents of the “concentration-fragility view” argue that larger banks are 
often more likely to receive public guarantees or subsidies, which is discussed as the “too big 
to fail”-doctrine (Mishkin, 1999). As a consequence, the moral hazard problem becomes 
more severe for larger bank’s managers who may take on risky investments under a 
government’s safety net. Second, it is argued that higher loan interest rates granted by 
monopolistic banks may induce borrowers to take on risky investments to compensate higher 
loan repayments (Boyd and De Nicoló, 2006). Accordingly, the likelihood of loan defaults 
may increase and induce a higher probability of bank failures. Third, Cetorelli et al. (2007) 
stress that a higher degree of risk diversification effects may result in reduced managerial 
efficiency, less effective internal corporate control and increased operational risk that may be 
prone to supervisory failures. Finally, it is suggested that the bank’s size is positively 
correlated with organizational complexity (Beck et al., 2006a, 2006b). Thus, an increasing 
firm size may be associated with lower transparency since the size allows banks to expand 
across multiple geographic markets and business lines, using sophisticated financial 
instruments enabling them to build complex corporate organizations. 
Empirical evidence on the relationship between market concentration and financial 
stability in banking is ambiguous as well. To begin with, using data on more than 100 
countries over the period from 1993 to 2000 De Nicoló et al. (2004) provide empirical 
evidence of increased risk profiles for the five largest conglomerate financial firms and of a 
higher level of systemic risk potential for more concentrated banking systems. 
Similarly, Schaeck and Čihák (2007) and Schaeck et al. (2006) examine the impact of market 
competition and concentration on systemic stability for more than 2,600 banks in the EU-10 
plus Switzerland for the period from 1999 to 2004. They find no evidence for a trade-off 
between market competition and the banks’ risk-taking. Rather, they find that banks tend to 
hold higher capital buffers when operating in a more competitive environment. These results  
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prove to be robust when controlling for banking market concentration and for a multitude of 
further sensitivity analyses. 
Finally, Beck et al. (2006a, 2006b) examine the effect of banking market concentration on 
the likelihood of suffering a systemic banking crisis using data on 69 countries over the 
period from 1980 to 1997. In contrast to De Nicoló et al. (2004) they provide empirical 
evidence that an increase in banking concentration does not result in higher banking system 
fragility. Their result is robust when controlling for differences in bank regulatory policies 
and national institutions affecting market structures and financial stability. 
3. Empirical analysis 
3.1.  Data 
Notes on variables and data sources, descriptive statistics for the entire set of included 
variables as well as empirical results from main regressions, robustness checks and sensitivity 
analyses are provided in the Appendix A. Descriptions of banks included into the sample, 
concentration ratios, results from first stage regressions and correlation matrices are reported 
in Appendix B. 
Our empirical analysis focuses on consolidated balance sheet data from „Monetary 
Financial Institutions”
2 (MFI) across the EU-25 for the period from 1997 to 2005 following 
the introduction of the “Single Banking License” in 1997 in Europe. This so-called “single 
passport” allows a bank licensed in one European country to open as many branches as it 
wishes anywhere in the community. Banks’ balance sheet data was retrieved from BankScope 
database provided by Fitch-IBCA. We included commercial banks, savings banks and credit 
                                                 
2  MFI comprise resident credit institutions as defined in European Community Law and other resident 
financial institutions that receive deposits and/or close substitutes for deposits from entities other than MFIs 
and, for their own account, to grant credits and/or make investments in securities (ECB, 2001).  
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cooperatives. Table 1 (Appendix B) reports the number of banks being included into our  
sample. 
In contrast to related empirical work (Beck et al., 2006a, 2006b; Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache, 2002) we do not include real episodes of banking crises as a proxy for the 
bank’s financial soundness. Though the number of bankruptcies in fact describes an accurate 
indicator, its significance may be distorted by three aspects. First, banking crises are 
announced and described differently across countries. Hence, it is difficult to define and date 
the exact beginning and end of a banking failure. Second, suffering from a banking crisis may 
be an implication of regulatory failures. For this reason, competent supervisory authorities 
will be less interested in completely announcing banking failures that have occurred within 
their own national borders. Third, failures of systemic-important banks are typically 
prevented by implementing financial restructuring programs in order to avoid contagion and 
hence systemic crises. 
Taking these aspects into account, we rather employ the banks’ distance to default as a 
proxy for financial soundness by employing the Z-score technique (e.g. De Nicoló et al., 
2004) which is denoted as follows: 
 
We construct this indicator per country and time by aggregating the banks’ consolidated 
balance sheet data and define µ as the return on average assets before taxes (ROAA), k as the 
equity capital in percent of total assets and σ as the standard deviation (volatility) of the 
ROAA. Hence, the Z-score combines in one single indicator the banks’ profitability (µ), 
capital ratio (k) and return volatility (σ). Obviously, the Z-score will increase with the banks’ 
profitability and capital ratio and decrease with increasing return volatility. From an 
economic viewpoint the Z-score initially measures the probability of a bank becoming 





 (1)  
  8
(lower)        Z-score implies a lower (higher) probability of insolvency risk. Table 2 
(Appendix A) indicates that the Z-score ratio displays a wide variation for European banks in 
our sample across countries and over time (-0.38 to 105.81). 
Measuring concentration for European banking markets is exceptional for a number of 
reasons. To begin with, in several European member states (Germany, Austria and Italy) a 
comparatively low concentration ratio (e.g., on average 20% for the German banking sector) 
results from the huge number of savings banks and credit cooperatives primarily acting in 
local markets. Though these banks are organized under separate banking associations, the 
member banks’ financial statements are not consolidated under the roof of their respective 
association. Hence, an error in concentration and competition measurement will arise when 
aggregating balance sheet data for these bank groups. Doing so, market concentration would 
significantly increase (e.g., for Germany to approx. 67%) and bias concentration and 
competition measures for these markets. Furthermore, some European countries (especially 
the UK) exhibit lower banking market concentration ratios, as they host international 
financial centers with a high presence of foreign banks among only a few domestic banks. In 
addition, some of the Eastern European Member States (e.g., Estonia) provide high 
concentration ratios since they are comparatively smaller than most of the Western European 
countries. The same aspect applies to Western European outskirt countries (e.g., Finland, 
Cyprus). Finally, in most of the Eastern European Member States formerly large state-owned 
banks have been privatized after financial deregulation which at first resulted in highly 
concentrated banking markets. However, with only a few exceptions concentration ratios 
decreased over time due to increasing foreign bank entry. Taking these aspects into account it 
seems less surprising that banking market concentration still differs significantly across 
European countries, ranging from very fragmented banking markets such as in Germany with 
a minimum ratio of 17% to higher concentrated ones in half of Europe and especially in 
emerging and outskirt European Member States with the highest concentration ratio of 99%  
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in Estonia (see Table 2, Appendix B for the wide variation of concentration ratios cross-
sectional and over time). 
In contrast to previous empirical work (Schaeck and Čihák, 2007; Schaeck et al., 2006; 
Beck et al., 2006a, 2006b) we do not use data from the BankScope database to calculate 
concentration ratios since the sample of banks reporting to BankScope increases over the 
sample period which forces to calculate average concentration ratios. Instead, we include 
concentration ratios which we retrieved from the ECB’s statistics and reports on EU banking 
structures and from competent national central banks for many eastern European countries, 
especially for the period from 1997 to 2000. Concentration (5) ratios are calculated as the 
fraction of assets of the total banking system’s assets held by the five largest domestic and 
foreign banks per country. Calculating concentration in this way addresses to the fact that the 
banking industry is further globalizing and that banks merge, acquire and compete not only 
within national boundaries but also cross-border. 
When examining the effect of banking market concentration on systemic stability it is 
imperative to control for macroeconomic, bank-specific, regulatory and institutional factors 
that are likely to affect market structures, financial stability or both and hence, help to 
mitigate omitted variable biases. We lagged some of the variables to avoid simultaneity. 
Macroeconomic control variables are retrieved from the World Development Indicator (WDI) 
database provided by the World Bank. We include GDP per capita, the rate of real GDP 
growth, and the annual change of inflation and short term real interest rates to capture 
macroeconomic developments that are likely to affect the quality of bank assets. The rate of 
growth of real GDP is a control variable since the banks’ investment opportunities may be 
correlated with business cycles (Laeven and Majoni, 2003). Hence, we expect a positive sign 
of the coefficient if investment opportunities rise under economic booms. In addition, 
borrowers’ solvency should be higher under increasing economic performance which raises 
banks’ asset quality. Furthermore, banks may pro-cyclically widen their capital under  
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economic booms and, hence, engage in precautionary measures in anticipation of 
forthcoming economic downturns. The effect of changes in inflation  rates depends on 
whether inflation is anticipated by banks or not and whether it coincides with general 
economic fragility. Since interest rates tend to rise in the presence of inflation, inflation is 
probably associated with a higher realization of net interest margins and profitability. 
However, as the banks’ funding costs may also increase under inflation the effect on 
profitability and bank capital ratios depends on the net effect from increasing net interest 
margins and costs. Similarly, changes in real short term interest rates are likely to implicitly 
influence asset quality. We include the one-period lagged interest rate changes and expect an 
ambiguous effect. While a passing through of increasing short term interest rates to deposit 
rates will raise the banks’ funding costs, a handing down to lending rates should raise 
profitability but might let loan repayment be more difficult for borrowers which may result in 
higher loan default rates. Nevertheless, the actual effect depends on the differences in the 
average maturity of assets and liabilities or banks’ capability to reprice assets and liabilities. 
Finally, two-period lagged credit growth is included as a control variable since excessive 
credit lending is suggested to be associated with decreasing capital ratios and hence, financial 
soundness (Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2006). 
Due to the fact that MFIs and banking markets vary across the EU-25 we employ further 
bank-specific variables. We include the banks’ net interest margin to control for profitability, 
the banks’ loan loss provisions as a key measure for credit risk and hence loan-portfolio 
quality and the banks’ cost-income ratio to control for the banks’ efficiency. We expect a 
positive sign of the coefficient of net interest margin and a negative sign of the coefficients of 
loan loss provisions and cost-income ratio. We further include an updated and modified 
version of the moral hazard index developed by Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002). In 
line with a considerable part of theoretical literature greater generosity of the deposit 
insurance system should contribute to more excessive risk-taking and hence financial      
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fragility. Thus, we expect a negative sign of the coefficient of moral hazard. However, in 
contrast, a positive impact is also possible if explicit deposit insurance indicates a 
commitment that deposit insurance is only limited to insured depositors, which encourages 
bank managers to be precautious and detain a higher amount of capital (Schaeck et al., 2006; 
Gropp and Vesala, 2005). 
To draw accurate inferences about the impact of concentration on stability we perform a 
variety of sensitivity analyses. First of all, we control for cross-country differences regarding 
the regulatory and institutional environment to provide information on possible linkages 
between banking regulation, national institutions and systemic stability. We use four time-
invariant measures of banking regulation and supervision proposed by Barth et al. (2004, 
2001). The variable entry restrictions describes the fraction of entry applications by domestic 
or foreign banks that have been denied. We expect an ambiguous effect of this control 
variable since restricted entry may increase domestic bank profits due to lower competitive 
pressures but it may also induce market inefficiencies. Activity restrictions is a key 
determinant for the scope of a bank’s business by aggregating measures of weather a bank is 
allowed to engage in securities, insurance and real estate markets. To the extent that activity 
restrictions keep banks from operating in too risky lines of business, banking systems with 
greater restrictions may be more stable (Beck et al., 2006a, 2006b; Barth et. al., 2004). In 
contrast, however, if a high level of activity restrictions prevents banks from diversifying 
asset risks outside traditional business, banking systems with greater restrictions may become 
more fragile. We finally include the capital regulatory index which is constructed by first 
principal component analysis following Barth et al. (2004). The index describes a summary 
measure of initial capital stringency and overall capital requirements. To the extent that 
greater capital stringency encourages prudent behavior and equity capital is an appropriate 
measure of the bank’s solvency, we expect better capitalized banks to be more stable.  
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Apart from regulatory aspects we also control for the institutional environment and assume 
that a greater strength and quality of institutions are further key factors of a well-developed 
and operating financial system. To begin with, governmental ownership measures the extent 
to which banks are owned by government which is of some importance especially for former-
soviet Eastern European countries. We expect a negative sign of the coefficient of 
government ownership since government-owned banks are suggested to hold a larger amount 
of non-performing loans (Berger et al., 2004). Moreover, it is assumed that moral hazard 
dominates in governmental banks. This is due to the fact that these banks may anticipate to be 
bailed out in case of a financial distress encouraging managers to be less committed to 
prudent behavior. We further control for a country’s level of exhibiting economic freedom by 
including a time-variant composite index of ten single freedoms provided by the Heritage 
Foundation. To the extent that greater freedoms allow banks to improve efficiency by 
engaging in different business lines next to traditional bank lending (securities, insurance, and 
real estate) and diversifying their risks, we expect an increased level of freedoms to support a 
bank’s financial soundness. In contrast, however, greater freedoms also allow banks to 
undertake greater risks, particularly if existing regulations promote risk-taking incentives. 
Thus, overall greater freedom may also lead to greater bank fragility. Finally, several studies 
from the “law and finance” research field stress the linkage between the origin of a country’s 
judicial system and financial sector development, e.g. protection of creditor rights (La Porta 
et al., 1998). Therefore, we separately include five dummy variables that take on the value 
one if a country has a British, French, German, Scandinavian or Soviet legal origin or zero 
otherwise. 
3.2.  Empirical model 
To test the hypothesis that banking market concentration affects financial stability, we use 
a country-specific random-effects model. Employing a country-specific rather than a bank-
specific random effects model is appropriate since despite similar patterns in the history of  
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most Eastern European countries, many of these countries differ from each other due to 
different transition processes to capitalist societies (Blanchard, 1999).
  
 In this context 
Murphy et al. (1992) present a theoretical model which provides arguments why some 
reforms work in one country, but do not work in other former socialist countries. Their 
theoretical insights confirm our strategy to control for unobserved heterogeneity on an 
individual country level. 
We estimate systemic stability in country i at time t as follows: 
 
1, it it it k it k it yc x         
 
where  it y represents the Z-score ratio in a country i and at time t as our measure of banking 
stability and  it c  is the banking market concentration rate. The vector  , it k x  includes control 
variables described above.  it   is an error term and   and the  's   denote the parameters to 
be estimated. 
Assuming that  it   can be composed into a bank-specific time-invariant component   and 
a component  it   capturing the remaining disturbance that is assumed to be uncorrelated over 
time so that the equation  it it       holds, the equation can be estimated with the random 
effects model. The random effects model is a consequent strategy as most variations should 
be observed over time and random effects allow for the inclusion of time-invariant variables 
among regressors. Considering banking regulation, all European countries in our sample 
follow the European Capital Requirement Directive (transformation of “Basel II”) and the 
European Banking Directive respectively. In this context, regulatory policies and national 
supervisory institutions have remained almost unchanged over the sample period. The 
absence of time variation in regulatory and supervisory control variables as well as the fact of 
a considerable time lag between regulatory changes and an effect on banks’ performance are 
commonly accepted in the literature and pointed out by Barth et al. (2004). Hence, from this 
(2)  
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point of view, financial markets in Europe form a homogenous entity. As a consequence, 
variation in the cross-section between regulatory and institutional explanatory variables is 
low and applying the random effects techniques is appropriate.
3 
3.3.  Empirical results 
We present empirical results in Table 3 (Appendix A). Regressions (1) and (2) are report 
main regressions results assessing the impact of banking market concentration on systemic 
stability as measured by the Z-score-technique. While regression specifications (3)-(5) use 
different concentration measures and omit bank-specific variables, regression specifications 
(6)-(7) are additional robustness checks using instrumental variable regressions to control for 
possible endogeneity of our independent variables. Table 4 reports further empirical results 
from regressing market concentration on single components of the Z-score, whereas Tables 5 
and 6 present empirical results from a variety of sensitivity analyses. 
3.3.1. Main findings 
As Table 3 (Appendix A) reports, concentration (5) enters regression (1) significantly 
negative at the one-percent level suggesting that increasing banking market concentration has 
a negative impact on European banks’ financial soundness which corresponds to the 
“concentration-fragility” view in theoretical literature and generally confirms empirical 
findings by De Nicoló et al. (2004). In contrast, this result does not support theoretical 
arguments and earlier empirical findings (Beck et al., 2006a, 2006b) promoting the 
“concentration-stability view”. 
                                                 
3  As Table 2 (Appendix A) reports, the number of observations varies which especially holds for included 
variables measuring the regulatory environment. Thus, in addition to random effects, we apply the 
consistent estimator for the variance components by Baltagi and Chang (1994) as a robustness check to 
avoid possible biases resulting from our unbalanced panel. However, as results did not differ significantly 
from the ordinary random effects estimations, we do not comment them in this paper.  
  15
Among the control variables, credit growth enters the regression significantly positive at 
the one-percent level, indicating that increasing credit lending is not associated with 
decreasing capital ratios, higher risk-taking and hence decreasing financial soundness. In 
contrast, we suggest that increasing credit lending opportunities enable banks to better 
diversify their loan portfolios which should result in a decreasing return volatility. As 
expected,  loan loss provisions and cost-income ratio enter the regression significantly 
negative, suggesting that higher asset quality and operational efficiency have a positive 
impact on the banks’ financial soundness. Introducing the moral hazard index, this variable 
enters the regression significantly positive at the five-percent level and hence, yields no 
evidence for the popular argument of excessive risk taking under a financial safety net. In 
contrast, we assume that deposit insurance may encourage bank managers to be precautious 
and detain a higher amount of capital if one is aware of the fact that deposit insurance is only 
limited to insured depositors. This is in line with theoretical arguments and previous 
empirical studies that do not find evidence for a positive impact of deposit insurance on 
moral hazard nor on the probability of suffering from a systemic crisis (Schaeck et al., 2006; 
Gropp and Vesala, 2005). 
By means of regressions (2)-(7) we investigate the robustness of our main results. As 
Table 7 (Appendix B) indicates, GDP per capita is highly correlated with a couple of our 
control variables, in particular the concentration measures. Due to this, we do not include 
GDP per capita into the main regression (1) and further regressions concerning robustness 
checks and sensitivity analyses. When including GDP per capita in specification (2), the 
variable enters the regression significantly positive at the one-percent level suggesting that 
banks in more developed countries exhibit higher financial soundness. However, as 
specification (2) reiterates the negative relationship between market concentration and 
financial stability, it is not sensitive to excluding GDP per capita from our main and further 
regressions.  
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We additionally control for the robustness of our main findings by the way we define 
concentration measures. We employ Concentration (3) as a measure of concentration ratios 
for the three largest domestic and foreign banks per country using the same calculation 
method as the ECB and Eastern European’s central banks in regression (3) and the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) in regression (4). As shown, both measures enter the 
respective regression significantly negative reconfirming the negative relationship between 
market concentration and European banks’ financial soundness. Hence, our main results are 
not sensitive to the definition of banking market concentration. 
Despite an appropriate definition of market concentration, this variable is likely to suffer 
from endogeneity with regard to our main regression specification (1). Hence, we first of all 
address to these statistical problem by eliminating the bank-specific control variables in 
regression specification (5) to examine if bank-specific endogeneity drives our finding of a 
negative relationship between concentration and stability. As shown, even though bank-
specific variables are excluded, our main finding is reiterated suggesting that main results are 
not driven by bank-specific endogeneity. 
We further apply 2SLS instrumental variable techniques in regression (6). We include 
index variables obtained from the Comparative Manifesto Project by the Manifesto Research 
Group which deals with different aspects of parliamentary democracies. The project focuses 
on content analyses of party manifestos from 50 countries covering all elections since 1945 to 
measure political positions of all relevant parliamentary parties. The first instrumental 
variable being included measures if parties of a country favor Keynesian demand 
management (basic  economic attitude) or in other words, propose a demand-oriented 
economic policy. Hence, as countries with demand-oriented economic policy tend to favor 
less competitive markets, this instrument should have a positive effect on market 
concentration. The second instrumental variable being employed is EU-integration which 
measures if the parties of a country are in opposition to European integration or specific  
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European policies. As the rejection of integration policies can be interpreted as an indicator 
of skepticism against a common market in Europe and competition in general, this variable 
again should have a positive impact on market concentration. Finally, we include the 
durability (duration) of the current political institutions which we obtained from the Polity IV 
Project database. As reported by the instrumental variable regression (6), results confirm our 
main finding from the standard random effects model that increasing banking market 
concentration has a negative impact on the bank’s financial soundness. Hence, we rule out 
that our main finding may be driven by endogeneity. 
Despite this, the causality running from market structure to market conduct is not clear 
since it is not obvious if banking market concentration itself depends on financial stability. 
Hence, reverse causality may arise, for example, if a large, financial healthy bank decides (or 
in line with restructuring programs: is encouraged) to merge with a weaker, troubled bank, 
thereby increasing market concentration. Thus, to address likely reverse causality concerning 
banking market concentration and stability, we again apply instrumental variable techniques 
using a 2SLS panel estimator in regression (7) and employ concentration (I) as the initial 
concentration rate from the year 1997 as an instrumental variable (Beck et al., 2006a, 
2006b).
4 As indicated by regression (7), the instrumental variable regression reconfirms our 
main result from the standard random effects model which suggests that the negative 
relationship between concentration and stability is not biased by reverse causality. 
By means of regressions (1)-(4) in Table 4 (Appendix A) we try to gain a better 
understanding of the relationship between concentration and the Z-score measure regressing 
the   5-bank concentration variable on single components of the Z-score ratio. To begin with, 
we include the banks’ ROAA as the dependent variable in specification (2) and hence, 
                                                 
4  Table 5 (Appendix B) exhibits correlation matrices of the instrumented variable and all instruments 
included into regressions (6) and (7). The results of the first stage of the 2SLS regressions confirm the 
validity of our instrumental variables (Table 3, Appendix B). 
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simultaneously add an industrial organization perspective to our analysis that allows us to 
evaluate the relationship between concentration and market efficiency. Applying traditional 
industrial organization theory to banking, the ROAA should increase for banks gaining 
market power in less competitive but concentrated banking markets. Even so, we did not 
observe any significant impact on ROAA when including the five-bank concentration ratio. 
Hence, in order to test for the effect of remarkably high market concentration on banks’ 
profitability we include concentration (H) as  a variable for highly concentrated banking 
industries in specification (2). This concentration variable is computed covering 
concentration ratios larger than 80% as calculated breaking points. The measure enters the 
regression significantly positive at the one-percent level, which supports industrial 
organization models of monopolistic banks gaining higher profits. As expected, the cost-
income ratio has a negative impact on the banks’ profitability. By means of regression (3) we 
assess the relationship between market concentration and the banks’ capital structure as the 
second component of the Z-score’s numerator. In correspondence to theoretical predictions 
(Boyd et al., 2004) and related empirical findings (Schaeck and Čihák, 2007; Schaeck et al., 
2006) concentration (5) enters the regression significantly positive at the five-percent level. 
Among the control variables inflation and net interest margin enter the regression 
significantly. The positive sign of the coefficient of net interest margin implies a positive 
relationship between profitability and the bank’s capital ratio which has also been found by 
other empirical studies (Flannery and Rangan, 2008; Schaeck and Čihák, 2007; Schaeck et 
al., 2006). We finally include the volatility of the ROAA as the Z-score’s denominator in 
specification (4). If it is true that credit risk is the main source of the bank’s overall risk 
exposure, the return volatility is a measure of loan portfolio quality. Concentration (5) enters 
the regression significantly positive but weak at the          10-percent level indicating that 
higher market concentration increases the volatility of bank asset returns and, hence, 
decreases loan portfolio quality. As shown, credit growth has a significant negative impact on  
  19
the return volatility supporting our findings from our main regression that increasing credit 
lending is not associated with higher risk-taking and hence, decreasing financial soundness. 
To sum up, taking the single results from regressions on Z-score components into account, 
one reason for the negative impact of market concentration on European banks’ financial 
soundness may be a higher return volatility of larger banks in concentrated markets. This may 
due to the fact that increasing market concentration has a positive impact on both the banks’ 
ROAA and capital ratios (Z-score’s numerator) but also affects the banks’ return volatility 
(Z-score’s denominator). 
3.3.2. Sensitivity analyses 
We perform a large variety of robustness checks. As a general result, our main finding of a 
negative relationship between concentration and stability holds even when controlling for the 
regulatory and institutional environment. Due to high correlation between these control 
variables (Table 7, Appendix B), we include them in turn in separate regressions (Table 5, 
Appendix A). 
First, we introduce entry and activity restrictions to control for governmental restrictions 
on financial openness and banking business. Both variables enter the regressions significantly 
positive for the EU-15 (Western Europe) but significantly negative for the EU-10 (Eastern 
Europe). Findings for Eastern Europe indicate that a lower level of competitive pressures and 
diversification opportunities induces higher fragility for Eastern European banking markets. 
This result is consistent with theoretical predictions and empirical findings suggesting that 
restricted market entry and business activity are likely to reduce the banking system’s 
efficiency and stability (Barth et al., 2004). In contrast, findings for Western Europe are in 
line with the “contestability”-literature stressing that concentration and competition describe 
two different characteristics of a market. Furthermore, this result supports empirical evidence 
that emphasizes the stabilizing effects of increasing competitiveness for banking markets 
(Boyd et al., 2006; Bikker and Haaf, 2002). Second, we include the capital regulatory index  
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entering the regressions significantly positive. Hence, our results support the theoretical 
assumption that higher levels of capital stringency are associated with higher financial 
soundness and prudential behavior by bank managers. Our findings that capital regulations 
have a positive effect on financial stability hold for both Western and Eastern European 
banking markets. Third, we control for governmental ownership. As expected, this variable 
enters the regressions negatively but becomes significant for Eastern European countries 
only. Hence, our results suggest that government-owned banks operating in concentrated 
Eastern European banking markets are more prone to financial fragility. Fourth, we include 
the index of economic freedom. This variable enters the regressions significantly negative for 
Eastern Europe but significantly positive for Western European countries. Accounting to this 
result and with regard to theoretical assumptions, we propose that larger banks in Western 
Europe may predominantly use greater freedoms to improve efficiency and risk 
diversification, whereas Eastern European banks seem to exploit greater freedoms to 
undertake greater risks, particularly if existing regulations promote risk-taking incentives. 
Finally, we separately control for the origin of the judicial systems several studies from the 
“law and finance” research field stress the linkage between the origin of a country’s judicial 
system and financial sector development, e.g. protection of creditor rights (La Porta et al., 
1998). We find that concentrated banking markets in countries with a soviet legal origin (all 
Eastern European countries) are more likely to be fragile whereas a French legal origin 
positively affects financial stability. 
4. Conclusion 
Using aggregate balance sheet data from more than 2,600 banks across the EU-25 over the 
period from 1997 to 2005 this paper provides empirical evidence that national banking 
market concentration has a negative impact on European banks’ financial soundness as 
measured by the Z-score technique while controlling for macroeconomic, bank-specific, 
regulatory and institutional factors. Empirical results from panel estimations hold when  
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employing alternative concentration measures, applying instrumental variable techniques to 
address likely endogeneity as well as possible reverse causality and performing a variety of 
further sensitivity analyses. Our findings are consistent with the “concentration-fragility 
view” and confirm empirical findings by De Nicoló et al. (2004). They are in contrast to 
arguments of the “concentration-stability view” and findings of empirical studies by Schaeck 
and Čihák (2007); Schaeck et al. (2006) and Beck et al. (2006a, 2006b). 
Investigating single Z-score components we additionally find that market concentration 
has a positive impact on banks’ ROAA, capital ratios and the volatility of the ROAA. Hence, 
we suggest that the negative relationship between concentration and stability may be driven 
by a higher return volatility of larger banks in concentrated markets. As a result from further 
sensitivity analyses, we provide empirical evidence that Eastern European banking markets 
exhibiting a lower level of competitive pressure, fewer diversification opportunities and a 
higher fraction of government-owned banks are more prone to financial fragility whereas 
capital regulations support financial stability across whole Europe. 
Against the background of our empirical results we deduce the following policy 
implications. First, as the European Commission has failed to do so until now, we stress the 
necessity of establishing the aspect of systemic stability as a further important criterion 
within the cross-border bank merger approval process under article 16 of the European 
Banking Directive. Furthermore, as systemic linkages of bank failures may amplify when 
fostering cross-border consolidation in European banking, we suggest further improving 
cross-country cooperation between European regulators and supervisors to clearly define 
responsibilities for prudential supervision and regulation of pan-European banks acting cross-
border. 
Second, if it is true that our measure of entry restrictions is an appropriate proxy for a 
banking market’s competitiveness, our empirical analysis reveals a positive relationship 
between objectives of competition policy (market efficiency) and banking regulation  
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(systemic stability) for Eastern, but not for Western European countries. Although competent 
authorities in Europe are legitimated to examine bank mergers under both efficiency and 
stability aspects (European Council, 1989, Article 5), the European Commission has given no 
attention to the linkage between efficiency and stability aspects in banking at all when 
revising article 16 of the European Banking Directive. Hence, as a possible trade-off between 
efficiency and stability in European banking can not completely be ruled out, it is necessary 
to additionally foster coordination between national antitrust authorities and supervisory 
bodies in Europe. 
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Statistical appendix A 
 
Table 1 








Variable Description  Data  Sources 
Z-score  Ratio of the sum of equity capital to total assets and ROAA 
to standard deviation of ROAA    Fitch-IBCA BankScope, own calc. 
ROAA  Return on average assets before tax (ROAA)    Fitch-IBCA BankScope KZ 4006 
Capital ratio  Ratio of equity capital to total assets    Fitch-IBCA BankScope KZ 2095 
sdROAA  Standard deviation of ROAA    Fitch-IBCA BankScope KZ 4006, own calc. 
Concentration (5)  EU 25 Concentration: Fraction of assets of a country’s total 
banking system's assets held by the largest 5 domestic banks.    ECB statistics, national central banks 
Concentration (3)  EU 25 Concentration: Fraction of assets of a country’s total 
banking system's assets held by the largest 3 domestic banks.    ECB statistics, national central banks, own calc. 
Concentration (I)  Initial market concentration (5) in 1997    ECB statistics, national central banks 
Concentration (H)  Dummy variable that takes on the value one if the 
concentration ratio is above 0.8 or zero otherwise.    ECB statistics, national central banks, own calc. 
HHI  Herfindahl-Hirschman index computed as the sum of the 
squared market shares of a country’s banks.    ECB statistics, national central banks, own calc. 
Basic economic 
attitude 
Index that measures to which extent relevant parties of a 
country favor Keynesian demand management and propose a 
demand-oriented economic policy. 
  Comparative Manifesto Project 
EU-integration 
Index that measures to which extent relevant parties of a 
country are in opposition to European integration or specific 
European policies. 
  Comparative Manifesto Project 
Duration  Index that measures the durability of the current political 
institutions in a country.    Polity IV Project 
GDP per capita  Ratio of GDP to population    World Development Indicators (WDI) 
Real GDP growth  Rate of real GDP growth at constant 2000 prices (annual 
percentage change)    World Development Indicators (WDI) 
Inflation  Log of annual change in inflation rate    World Development Indicators (WDI) 
Real interest rate (t-1)  Lag (1) of annual change of real short term interest rate, 
adjusted for inflation (GDP deflator)    World Development Indicators (WDI) 
Credit growth (t-2)  Lag (2) of growth rate of domestic credit to the private sector 
to GDP    World Development Indicators (WDI) 
Net interest margin  Log of accounting value of bank's net interest revenue as a 
share of its interest-bearing (total earning) assets    Fitch-IBCA BankScope KZ 2035 
Loan loss provisions  Loan loss provisions in thousand USD    Fitch-IBCA BankScope KZ 2095 
Cost-income ratio  Ratio of overhead costs to total revenue    Fitch-IBCA BankScope KZ 4029 
Moral hazard index 
Index that measures the generosity of the deposit insurance 
regime. Index is built by first principal component analysis 
of the following deposit insurance design features: 
coinsurance, coverage of foreign currency and interbank 
deposits, type of funding, source of funding, management, 
membership, and the level of explicit coverage. Higher index 
values indicate greater moral hazard. 
  Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002)  
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Table 1 (cont’d) 
Notes on variables and data sources 
Variable Description  Data  Sources 
Entry restrictions  Fraction of entry applications denied (domestic and foreign banks)    Barth et al. (2001, 2004) 
Activity restrictions 
Index aggregates measures that indicate whether bank activities in 
the securities, insurance, and real estate markets and ownership and 
control of non-financial firms are unrestricted, permitted, restricted, 
or prohibited. The aggregate indicator ranges between (0) and (4), 
with higher values indicating greater activity restrictions arising 
from legal requirements. 
  Barth et al. (2001, 2004) 
Capital regulatory index 
Index that measures the overall capital stringency. Index is built by 
first principal component analysis of initial capital stringency and 
overall capital stringency. Higher index values indicate greater 
capital stringency. 
  Barth et al. (2001, 2004) 
Governmental ownership  Fraction of assets of a country’s total banking system's assets held 
by government.    Barth et al. (2001, 2004) 
Economic freedom 
Composite index of ten indicators ranking policies in the areas of 
trade, government finances, government interventions, monetary 
policy, capital flows and foreign investment, banking and finance, 
wages and prices, property rights, regulation, and black market 
activity. Index scores from 0-100 with higher scores indicating 
polices being more conducive to competition and economic 
freedom. 
  Heritage Foundation 
British legal origin  Dummy variable that takes on the value one if the country’s legal 
system is of British legal origin or zero otherwise.    La Porta et al. (1998) 
French legal origin  Dummy variable that takes on the value one if the country’s legal 
system is of French legal origin or zero otherwise.    La Porta et al. (1998) 
German legal origin  Dummy variable that takes on the value one if the country’s legal 
system is of German legal origin or zero otherwise.    La Porta et al. (1998) 
Scandinavian legal origin  Dummy variable that takes on the value one if the country’s legal 
system is of Scandinavian legal origin or zero otherwise.    La Porta et al. (1998) 
Soviet legal origin  Dummy variable that takes on the value one if the country’s legal 
system is of Soviet legal origin or zero otherwise.    La Porta et al. (1998) 27 
Table 2 
Descriptive statistics 
Variable  N  Mean SD  Min Max 
Z-score 225  26.896  20.425  -0.38  105.81 
ROAA  225  11.787 17.694 -85.262 113.48 
Capital  ratio  225  7.002 5.013 0.344  35.163 
sdROAA  225  0.985 2.886 0.002  28.7 
Concentration  (5)  225 0.592  0.21 0.17 0.99 
Concentration  (3)  225  0.722 0.196 0.237  1 
Concentration (H)  225  0.2178  0.414  0  1 
HHI 225  1146.636  862.0  114  4067 
Basic economic attitude  225  0.516  0.772  0  4.02 
EU-integration 225  0.867  1.005  0  5 
Duration 207  36.435  29.966  4  125 
Concentration (I)  225  0.6072  0.236  0.17  0.97 
GDP  per  capita  225  16625.92 10629.36 2727.392 51590.18 
Real GDP growth  225  3.611  2.496  -2.3  11.5 
Inflation 225  -3.684  0.775  -6.812  -1.699 
Real interest rate (t-1)  200  -0.542  1.961  -9.34  8.54 
Credit growth (t-2)  175  93.758  49.33  12.785  237.758 
Net interest margin  225  -3.598  0.463  -5.099  -2.432 
Loan loss provisions  225  351868.1  588472.5  -648061  2854958 
Cost-income ratio  225  66.572  39.69  21.15  588.224 
Moral hazard index  225  0.256 2.899 -4.907 5.623 
Entry restrictions  180  0.083  0.147  0  0.5 
Activity restrictions  189  2.143  1.039  0  4 
Capital regulatory index  189  0.442  0.906  -1.389  1.435 
Governmental ownership  216  7.967  10.225  0  42.2 
Economic freedom  225  66.607  6.374  49  81 
British legal origin  225  0.24  0.428  0  1 
French legal origin  225  0.28  0.45  0  1 
German legal origin  225  0.28  0.45  0  1 
Scandinavian legal origin  225  0.12  0.326  0  1 
Soviet legal origin  225  0.08  0.272  0  1 
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Table 3 
Z-score and concentration 
  (1) Z-score  (2) Z-score  (3) Z-score  (4) Z-score  (5) Z-score  (6) Z-score  (7) Z-score 
         
Concentration (5)  −22.0068  −16.6311    −16.7815  −61.9203  −50.8123 
  (0.003)***  (0.027)**    (0.038)**  (0.019)**  (0.009)*** 
Concentration (3)      −13.7783      
     ( 0 . 0 8 0 ) *       
HHI      −0.0041     
      ( 0 . 0 1 4 ) * *      
GDP  per  capita    0.0006       
    (0.001)***       
Real GDP growth  −0.0315 0.0554  0.0454 −0.0827 0.0123 −0.1376  −0.0387 
  (0.888) (0.797) (0.845) (0.710) (0.952) (0.590) (0.902) 
Inflation  −1.5398  −1.4827  −1.7207  −1.7627  −1.9753  −1.4176  −1.3171 
 (0.119)  (0.097)*  (0.111)  (0.087)*  (0.022)**  (0.177)  (0.189) 
Real  interest  rate  (t-1)  0.2475 0.2016 0.3327 0.1889 0.1557 0.2161 0.2474 
  (0.318) (0.377) (0.207) (0.444) (0.479) (0.371) (0.490) 
Credit  growth  (t-2)  0.0756 0.0574 0.0793 0.0678 0.0732 0.0845 0.0754 
 (0.003)***  (0.017)**  (0.001)***  (0.006)*** (0.005)*** (0.001)*** (0.018)*** 
Net interest margin  0.8678  1.6159  0.4461  0.0214    3.6500  2.4889 
  (0.660) (0.407) (0.807) (0.991)    (0.189) (0.277) 
Loan loss provisions  −2.58e-06  −2.71e-06  −2.38e-06  −2.68e-06  −2.59e-06  −2.71e-06 
 (0.100)*  (0.085)*  (0.131)  (0.089)*   (0.107)  (0.026)** 
Cost-income ratio  −0.0143  −0.0138  −0.0133  −0.0128  −0.1460  −0.0152 
  (0.050)** (0.080)* (0.050)** (0.062)*  (0.061)*  (0.238) 
Moral  hazard  index  1.8204 1.5213 1.4813 1.8183 1.7034 2.9201 2.2332 
 (0.019)**  (0.055)*  (0.058)*  (0.031)** (0.065)* (0.020)**  (0.021)** 
         
Time  Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
No.  of  Obs.  175 175 175 175 175 161 175 
No.  of  Groups 25 25 25 25 25 23 25 
Wald χ
2  173.09*** 182.15*** 168.43*** 157.12***  130.64  124.62***  61.24*** 
Adj. R
2  0.26 0.37 0.18 0.20 0.29 0.15 0.29 
The panel model estimated is Z-score (i=country, j=time) = α + β1 Concentration (5)i,t + β2 Real GDP growthi,t + β3 Inflationi,t + β4 Real interest ratei,t-1 + β5 Credit growthi,t-2 + β6 Net interest margini,t + β7 Loan loss 
provisionsi,t + β8 Cost-income ratioi,t + β9 Moral hazard indexi,t + εi,t. GDP per capita is additionally included in specification (2). 
Concentration (5) is substituted by alternative measures Concentration (3) in specification (3) and HHI in specification (4). Bank-specific variables are omitted in specification (5). Concentration (5) is instrumented 
using Basic economic attitude, EU-integration and Duration in specification (6) and the initial concentration rate in specification (7). Regressions (6) and (7) are estimated by means of a 2SLS instrumental variable 
regression. Constant term included but not reported. Heteroscedasticity consistent P-values are in parenthesis. ***, **, *: statistically significant at the 1, 5 and 10% level. 29 
Table 4 
Z-score components and concentration 
  (1) ROAA  (2) ROAA  (3) Capital Ratio  (4) sdROAA 
       
Concentration (5)  6.3070    8.0015  1.1292 
 (0.198)    (0.012)**  (0.085)* 
Concentration (H)    6.5973     
   (0.010)***     
Real GDP growth  0.0009  −0.1082  −0.2695 0.0390 
 (0.999)  (0.903)  (0.144)  (0.715) 
Inflation 2.4458  2.8492  −1.1956 0.1144 
 (0.408)  (0.316)  (0.062)*  (0.763) 
Real interest rate (t-1)  −0.2163  −0.3116  −0.1365  −0.0753 
 (0.832)  (0.763)  (0.421)  (0.438) 
Credit growth (t-2)  0.0094  0.0044  −0.0085  −0.0107 
 (0.729)  (0.866)  (0.510)  (0.012)** 
Net interest margin  1.4748  0.9891  1.3791  −0.1255 
 (0.654)  (0.751)  (0.091)*  (0.651) 
Loan loss provisions  −5.26e-06  −4.70e-06  −2.09e-07  −2.77e-07 
 (0.113)  (0.149)  (0.518)  (0.232) 
Cost-income ratio  −0.1840  −0.1785  −0.0016  −0.0044 
 (0.011)**  (0.012)**  (0.586)  (0.128) 
Moral hazard index  −0.0765  −0.3919  −0.0904  −0.0371 
 (0.861)  (0.406)  (0.691)  (0.469) 
        
Time Dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes 
No. of Obs.  175  175  175  175 
No. of Groups  25  25  25  25 
Wald χ
2 365.79***  425.64***  213.72***  45.47*** 
Adj. R
2  0.28 0.29  0.23 0.17 
The panel model estimated is Z-score (i=country, j=time) = α + β1 Concentration (5)i,t + β2 Real GDP growthi,t + β3 Inflationi,t + β4 Real interest 
ratei,t-1 + β5 Credit growthi,t-2 + β6 Net interest margini,t + β7 Loan loss provisionsi,t + β8 Cost-income ratioi,t + β9 Moral hazard indexi,t + εi,t. 
Z-score is substituted by its single components ROAA, Capital ratio and standard deviation of ROAA in specifications (1)-(4). 
Concentration (5) is substituted by Concentration (H) as a measure of high concentration in specification (2). 
Constant term included but not reported. Heteroscedasticity consistent P-values are in parenthesis. ***, **, *: statistically significant at the 





Sensitivity analyses: regulatory and institutional environment 
  (1)  Z-score    (2)  Z-score    
        
Concentration (5)  −29.7474  −27.1192  −22.4910  −30.1786  −26.9300  −27.4448 
 (0.027)**  (0.041)**  (0.059)*  (0.005)*** (0.016)**  (0.020)** 
Entry restrictions  −9.6524       
  (0.615)       
  EU-10    −34.0645      
    (0.019)**      
  EU-15      151.2443       
     (0.026)**     
Activity restrictions        −3.1516    
      (0.181)    
  EU-10          −5.0131  
       (0.001)***   
    EU-15        4.7001 
        ( 0 . 0 6 0 ) *  
        
Time  Dummies  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
No.  of  Obs.  140 140 140 147 147 147 
No.  of  Groups  20 20 20 21 21 21 
Wald χ
2  123.23*** 127.54*** 122.21*** 218.87*** 175.76*** 140.35*** 
Adj. R
2  0.27 0.30 0.41 0.31 0.36 0.31 
The panel model estimated is Z-score (i=country, j=time) = α + β1 Concentration (5)i,t + β2 Real GDP growthi,t + β3 Inflationi,t + β4 Real interest 
ratei,t-1 + β5 Credit growthi,t-2 + β6 Net interest margini,t + β7 Loan loss provisionsi,t + β8 Cost-income ratioi,t + β9 Moral hazard indexi,t + εi,t. 
Constant term included but not reported. Heteroscedasticity consistent P-values are in parenthesis. ***, **, *: statistically significant at the 
1, 5 and 10% level. 
 
Table 5 (cont’d) 
.Sensitivity analyses: regulatory and institutional environment 
  (3)  Z-score    (4)  Z-score    
        
Concentration (5)  −26.8870  −34.4601  −21.8623  −20.9535  −18.2986  −19.8980 
 (0.017)**  (0.002)***  (0.086)* (0.011)**  (0.014)**  (0.017)** 
Capital regulatory index  8.1576           
  (0.002)***       
  EU-10    8.1423         
   (0.001)***        
  EU-15      9.2846       
     (0.061)*     
        
Governmental ownership        −0.4173    
       (0.070)*    
  EU-10          −0.6887  
       (0.064)*   
    EU-15        −0.2438 
        (0.320) 
        
Time  Dummies  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
No.  of  Obs.  147 147 147 168 168 168 
No.  of  Groups  21 21 21 24 24 24 
Wald χ
2  205.82*** 228.00*** 162.16*** 165.52*** 150.86*** 155.99*** 
Adj. R
2  0.39 0.35 0.34 0.27 0.27 0.25 
The panel model estimated is Z-score (i=country, j=time) = α + β1 Concentration (5)i,t + β2 Real GDP growthi,t + β3 Inflationi,t + β4 Real interest 
ratei,t-1 + β5 Credit growthi,t-2 + β6 Net interest margini,t + β7 Loan loss provisionsi,t + β8 Cost-income ratioi,t + β9 Moral hazard indexi,t + εi,t. 
Constant term included but not reported. Heteroscedasticity consistent P-values are in parenthesis. ***, **, *: statistically significant at the 
1, 5 and 10% level.  
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Table 5 (cont’d) 
.Sensitivity analyses: regulatory and institutional environment 
  (5)  Z-score    (6)  Z-score        
             
Concentration (5)  −21.8520  −16.2033  −15.9971  −22.0915  −19.3919  −22.1112  −22.0923  −21.7971 
 (0.004)***  (0.031)**  (0.037)**  (0.004)***  (0.008)***  (0.003)***  (0.003)***  (0.004)*** 
Economic freedom  −0.0684              
 (0.736)               
  EU-10    −0.2434            
   (0.002)***            
  EU-15      0.2102           
     (0.001)***           
             
British legal origin        −7.9478         
       (0.123)         
French  legal  origin       15.3706       
       (0.041)**       
German  legal  origin        −4.5093     
        (0.386)     
Scandinavian legal origin              3.5533   
          (0.657)   
Soviet  legal  origin            −14.7312 
            (0.044)** 
             
Time  Dummies  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
No.  of  Obs.  175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 
No.  of  Groups  25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 
Wald χ
2  174.58*** 178.38*** 181.37*** 173.50*** 197.08*** 180.41*** 165.32*** 172.19*** 
Adj. R
2  0.26 0.35 0.33 0.29 0.34 0.26 0.26 0.28 
The panel model estimated is Z-score (i=country, j=time) = α + β1 Concentration (5)i,t + β2 Real GDP growthi,t + β3 Inflationi,t + β4 Real interest ratei,t-1 + β5 Credit growthi,t-2 + β6 Net interest margini,t + β7 Loan loss 
provisionsi,t + β8 Cost-income ratioi,t + β9 Moral hazard indexi,t + εi,t. 
Constant term included but not reported. Heteroscedasticity consistent P-values are in parenthesis. ***, **, *: statistically significant at the 1, 5 and 10% level.  
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Statistical appendix B 
 
Table 1 
Number of EU-25 MFIs in sample 
Year  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
EU-15           
Austria  133 144 160 187 206 197 157 121 115 
Belgium  103  95 94 96 90 81 58 55 51 
Denmark  101 105 112 122 113 112  99  65  61 
Finland  16 16 15 18 16 15 13 11 12 
France  436 420 463 476 477 418 358 199 186 
Germany  1698 1655 1634 1550 1479 1414 1343 1309 1237 
Greece  22 19 18 18 17 20 16 14 13 
Ireland  48 52 62 61 60 60 43 17 15 
Italy  648 641 715 718 765 733 315 412 396 
Luxembourg  140 133 141 128 113 106  83  77  72 
The  Netherlands  68 69 73 78 76 76 54 20 13 
Portugal  45 46 44 46 40 37 24 21 20 
Spain  154 147 136 145 157 153 137 133 128 
Sweden  28 30 40 42  123  125  115  109  104 
United  Kingdom 372 381 376 378 379 371 274 160 147 
Total EU-15  4012 3953 4083 4063 4111 3918 3089 2723 2570 
           
EU-10           
Czech  Republic 27 25 28 31 32 29 18 14 13 
Cyprus  21 23 18 19 19 20 11 14 12 
Estonia  11  5 5 6 6 7 7 5 5 
Hungary  27 26 30 37 33 32 26 19 19 
Latvia  22 19 19 20 22 22 22 10 10 
Lithuania  9 9 9  10  10  10  10  7 7 
Malta  9 10 9 10 8  8  8  5  5 
Poland  43 40 42 46 45 40 29 17 16 
Slovakia  21 21 18 22 22 22 12 14 13 
Slovenia  26 21 21 21 19 17 17 14 13 
Total EU-10  216 199 199 222 216 207 160 119 113 
Total EU-25  4228 4152 4282 4285 4327 4125 3249 2842 2683 




Five-bank concentration ratios across the EU-25 (geographical distribution) 
Year  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Western Europe           
Austria  0.4424 0.4254 0.4122 0.4356 0.4573 0.4656 0.4412 0.4443 0.4517 
Belgium  0.5473 0.6358 0.7611 0.7592 0.7808 0.8235 0.8423 0.8451 0.8552 
Cyprus  0.8895 0.8824 0.8761 0.8773 0.6132 0.5784 0.5763 0.5751 0.5982 
Denmark  0.7046 0.7147 0.7122 0.6084 0.6835 0.6809 0.6735 0.6713 0.6634 
Finland  0.8833 0.8625 0.8641 0.8758 0.8054 0.7943 0.8138 0.8382 0.8335 
France  0.4046 0.4144 0.4367 0.4723 0.4745 0.4555 0.4758 0.4540 0.5451 
Germany  0.1723 0.1965 0.1972 0.2072 0.2092 0.2146 0.2241 0.2263 0.2146 
Greece 0.5646  0.6342  0.6775 0.6557 0.6713 0.6774 0.6729 0.6534 0.6657 
Hungary  0.6297 0.6595 0.6721 0.6123 0.5644 0.5455 0.5284 0.5291 0.5322 
Ireland  0.4134 0.4044 0.4155 0.4161 0.4371 0.4647 0.4481 0.4476 0.4652 
Italy  0.2535 0.2492 0.2535 0.2338 0.2966 0.3142 0.2757 0.2663 0.2748 
Luxembourg  0.2346 0.2578 0.2641 0.2648 0.2836 0.3066 0.3276 0.3063 0.3111 
Malta  0.9615 0.9341 0.9257 0.8966 0.8114 0.8245 0.7770 0.7851 0.7532 
The  Netherlands  0.7945 0.8288 0.8213 0.8155 0.8337 0.8366 0.8443 0.8431 0.8583 
Portugal  0.4648 0.4563 0.4478 0.5953 0.6044 0.6167 0.6352 0.6768 0.6955 
Spain  0.3257 0.3556 0.4168 0.4688 0.4534 0.4467 0.4443 0.4233 0.4236 
Sweden  0.5847 0.5656 0.5628 0.5737 0.5522 0.5656 0.5416 0.5489 0.5767 
United  Kingdom  0.2493 0.2525 0.2836 0.2845 0.2976 0.3044 0.3367 0.3532 0.3634 
Eastern Europe           
Czech Republic  0.8385  0.7963 0.7074 0.6058 0.6843 0.6572 0.6581 0.6403 0.6553 
Estonia  0.9673 0.9868 0.9869 0.9751 0.9896 0.9955 0.9923 0.9862 0.9877 
Latvia  0.4998 0.5574 0.5598 0.5590 0.6341 0.6534 0.6318 0.6243 0.6732 
Lithuania  0.9137 0.9384 0.8741 0.8653 0.8760 0.8394 0.8134 0.7890 0.8060 
Poland  0.5810 0.5685 0.5597 0.5597 0.5473 0.5342 0.5234 0.5022 0.4865 
Slovakia  0.6715 0.6177 0.6790 0.6794 0.6613 0.6644 0.6752 0.6658 0.6772 
Slovenia  0.5754 0.6645 0.6659 0.6760 0.6843 0.6642 0.6464 0.6325 0.6235 




First stage regressions (instruments) 
  (1) (2) 
    
Basic economic attitude  0.0185   
 (0.027)**   
EU-integration 0.0148   
 (0.079)*   
Duration  −0.0018  
 (0.091)*   
Concentration (I)    0.6279 
   (0.000)*** 
Real GDP growth  −0.0008  −0.0011 
 (0.710)  (0.651) 
Inflation 0.0090  0.0067 
 (0.175)  (0.391) 
Real interest rate (t-1)  −0.0007 0.0002 
 (0.733)  (0.939) 
Credit growth (t-2)  −0.0002 0.0001 
 (0.487)  (0.641) 
Net interest margin  0.0488  0.0532 
 (0.017)**  (0.001)*** 
Loan loss provisions  3.75e-09  −6.70e-10 
 (0.665)  (0.944) 
Cost-income ratio  −7.60e-06  −2.27e-05 
 (0.864)  (0.823) 
Moral hazard index  0.0313  0.0021 
 (0.015)**  (0.777) 
    
    
No. of Obs.  161  175 
No. of Groups  23  25 
Wald χ
2 265.12  177.56*** 
Adj. R
2  0.06 0.23 
Concentration (5) is instrumented by Basic economic attitude, EU-integration and Duration                                                                                         
in specification (1). It is instrumented by the initial concentration ratio in specification (2).                                                                                           
P-values are in parenthesis.  ***, **, *: statistically significant at the 1, 5 and 10% level.  
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Table 4 



























































































































































































































Concentration  (5) 1.00             
ROAA  0.07**  1.00            
Capital  Ratio  0.37***  0.20***  1.00           
sdROAA  0.15**  0.03*  0.21***  1.00          
Real  GDP  growth  0.15**  0.12**  0.21***  0.20***  1.00         
Inflation  0.14**  -0.04*  0.19***  0.09*  0.16**  1.00        
Real interest rate (t-1)  0.04*  -0.17**  0.01*  -0.22***  -0.15**  -0.04*  1.00           
Credit growth (t-2)  -0.22***  0.02**  -0.35***  -0.33*  -0.42***  -0.14*  0.19**  1.00         
Net  interest  margin  0.26*** -0.04 0.29***  0.19** -0.01*  0.30***  -0.05* -0.16**  1.00       
Loan loss provisions  -0.13**  -0.21*  -0.12*  -0.09**  -0.22***  0.06*  0.08**  0.09*  -0.02**  1.00     
Cost-income  ratio  0.02*  -0.42***  -0.06* 0.14** -0.02* 0.12**  0.04***  -0.13*  0.11*  -0.04*  1.00   


























































































Concentration (5)  1.0000      
Basic economic 
attitude  0.1703**  1.0000     
EU-integration  −0.1431** 0.0387  1.0000     
Duration  −0.2783*** 0.1437**  0.5011***  1.0000   






Correlation matrix (bank level variables) 
  Net interest margin  Loan loss provisions  Cost-income ratio 
Net interest margin  1.0000    
Loan loss provisions  −0.0218*** 1.0000   

























































































































































































































































































































































































































Concentration  (5)  1.00                    
Concentration  (3)  0.65***  1.00                   
HHI  0.89***  0.58***  1.00                  
GDP  per  capita  -0.44***  -0.26***  -0.39***  1.00                 
Real GDP growth  0.15**  0.01  0.24***  -
0.22***  1.00                
Inflation 0.14**  -0.11  0.10  -
0.22***  0.15**  1.00               
Real interest rate (t-1)  0.05  0.12*  0.07  0.15**  -0.15**  -0.04  1.00              
Credit  growth  (t-2)  -0.23**  0.11  -0.32***  0.44***  -0.42***  -0.14*  0.18**  1.00             
Moral hazard index  0.11*  -0.15**  0.21***  0.15**  -0.14**  -0.11*  0.07  -0.04  1.00            
Entry restrictions  0.11  -0.11  0.07  -
0.38***  0.04  0.01  -0.06  -0.37***  -0.18**  1.00           
Activity restrictions  0.14*  0.05  -0.09  -
0.27***  -0.12*  0.06  -0.18**  -0.42***  -0.25***  0.51***  1.00          
Capital regulatory index  -0.15**  -0.01  0.03  0.32***  -0.15**  -0.01  0.16**  0.42***  0.12  -0.30***  -0.58***  1.00         
Governmental ownership  -0.32***  -0.11  -0.28***  -0.13*  -0.11  0.05  -0.09  -0.03  -0.05  -0.07  0.06  -0.06  1.00        
Economic  freedom  -0.11*  0.02  0.02 0.52*** 0.10 -0.23***  0.14**  0.28***  0.03  -0.12  -0.46***  0.18**  -0.26***  1.00       
British legal origin  -0.01  -0.09  -0.09 -0.15**  0.07 0.27*** -0.01 0.29***  -0.14**  0.19**  -0.19*** 0.12 -0.22***  0.12*  1.00         
French legal origin  -0.24***  -0.20***  -0.24***  0.36*** -0.22*** -0.15**  0.06  0.26***  0.09  0.18**  -0.19*** 0.34***  -0.05  0.01  -0.35*** 1.00       
German legal origin  0.10  0.07  0.26***  -
0.28***  0.26***  0.06  -0.01 -0.34***  0.13**  -0.01 -0.19*** -0.06 0.33***  -0.11*  -0.35***  -0.39*** 1.00     
Scandinavian legal origin  0.17***  0.38***  0.12*  0.36***  -0.11 -0.34*** 0.06  -0.02 -0.19*** -0.09 0.34***  -0.17**  -0.25*** 0.12* -0.21***  -0.23***  -0.23***  1.00   
Soviet legal origin  0.03  -0.17**  -0.04  -
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